Password breach registry

ABSTRACT

A password breach registry is utilized to secure a service provided by a service provider. The password breach registry is a publicly accessible registry and includes password tokens written by breached service providers. The password tokens indicate passwords used to access breached service providers that may have been breached. A service provider can subscribe to the password breach registry and periodically query the password breach registry to determine if a password token corresponding to a user of a service provided by the service provider has been written to the password breach registry. This may indicate that the user of the service utilizes the same password on other services that have been breached. Upon determining that the password token has been written to the password breach registry, the user can be locked out from the service to prevent a malicious actor from gaining access to the account of the user.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of and claims priority to U.S.application Ser. No. 15/920,873 (Attorney Docket No. CATN.289392) filedMar. 14, 2018, which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.15/254,464 (Attorney Docket No. CATN.255710) filed Sep. 1, 2016, nowU.S. Pat. No. 10,079,855, issued Sep. 18, 2018.

BACKGROUND

The vast majority of websites and applications accessible via theInternet or a mobile device offer some sort of sign in or sign upfunctionality. This functionality enables a user of a particular websiteor application to create an account or access the account associatedwith the respective service provided by the website or application.Passwords associated with the user accounts are typically stored in somevariety of database or directory. As the increasing rate of passwordbreaches provide constant reminders, these password databases ordirectories can be accessed by malicious actors. Consequently, thepasswords can then be used against the user that originally signed upfor the particular website or application.

To add to this problem, users often reuse the same username and passwordon multiple websites or applications. If one database or directory isbreached, an attacker may be able to access additional websites orapplications by simply retrying the same credentials on the additionalwebsites or applications.

SUMMARY

This summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in asimplified form that are further described below in the detaileddescription. This summary is not intended to identify key features oressential features of the claimed subject matter, nor should it be usedas an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to utilizing a passwordbreach registry to secure a service. The password breach registry is apublicly accessible registry and includes password tokens written bybreached service providers. The password tokens indicate passwords usedto access breached service providers that may have been breached. Aservice provider can subscribe to the password breach registry andperiodically query the password breach registry to determine if apassword token corresponding to a user of a service provided by theservice provider has been written to the password breach registry. Thismay indicate that the user of the service utilizes the same password onother services that have been breached. Upon determining that thepassword token has been written to the password breach registry, theuser can be locked out from the service to prevent a malicious actorfrom gaining access to the account of the user.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present disclosure is described in detail below with reference tothe attached drawing figures, wherein:

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a password breach registry system forutilizing a password breach registry to secure a service, in accordancewith an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram showing an exemplary password breach registrythat can be utilized to prevent a breach at a second site after a firstsite has been breached, in accordance with an embodiment of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 3 is a flow diagram showing a method for utilizing a passwordbreach registry to secure a service, in accordance with an embodiment ofthe present disclosure;

FIG. 4 is a flow diagram showing a method for locking out a usercorresponding to a breached token from a service, in accordance with anembodiment of the present disclosure; and

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary computing environment suitablefor use in implementing embodiments of the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The subject matter of the present disclosure is described withspecificity herein to meet statutory requirements. However, thedescription itself is not intended to limit the scope of this patent.Rather, the inventors have contemplated that the claimed subject mattermight also be embodied in other ways, to include different steps orcombinations of steps similar to the ones described in this document, inconjunction with other present or future technologies. Moreover,although the terms “step” and/or “block” may be used herein to connotedifferent elements of methods employed, the terms should not beinterpreted as implying any particular order among or between varioussteps herein disclosed unless and except when the order of individualsteps is explicitly described. As used herein, the singular forms “a,”“an,” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms as well, unlessthe context clearly indicates otherwise.

As noted in the background, passwords associated with user accountsutilized to access services provided by websites or applications aretypically stored in some variety of database or directory. Maliciousactors are becoming increasingly adept at breaching these databases ordirectories and stealing user passwords. As a result, the passwords canbe used against the user that originally signed up for the particularwebsite or application. The malicious actors may attempt to access otherservices provided by other websites or applications utilizing the samepasswords. If any users reuse the same username and password on theseother services, the malicious actors may be able to access them as well.

Embodiments of the present disclosure are generally directed toutilizing a public password breach registry to secure a service. In thisway, users are protected from malicious actors that have stolenpasswords from a breached service by preventing the malicious actorsfrom using the stolen passwords to breach additional services. Passwordtokens corresponding to passwords of user accounts that have beencompromised are published to the password breach registry by thebreached service provider. The password breach registry is ablockchain-like format which, as explained in more detail below,prevents tampering and revision. Password tokens identify passwords ofusers that have been or may have been compromised. A subscribingprovider may periodically search the password breach registry todetermine whether a password used by a user of its service has beenwritten to the password breach registry. If the subscribing providerdetermines that a password token corresponding to a password of asubscribing user has been written to the password breach registry, thesubscribing provider can take proactive steps to lock the account of theaffected user and/or force the user to provide additional credentialsprior to accessing the account.

For example, assume a user signs up for both GMAIL and EBAY accounts andhappens to use the same password on both sites. If an attacker is ableto compromise a service provided by EBAY and steal EBAY passwords, theattacker may be able to access the GMAIL account. To prevent additionalattacks, when EBAY discovers the breach, EBAY can publish accounts thatwere potentially exposed to the public (such as via the dark web—need toadd stuff on this). If GMAIL is monitoring the password breach registry,GMAIL is able to determine which GMAIL users may be at risk and takesteps to deny an attacker any access using the stolen passwords.

To make public the fact that these passwords have been breached, withoutreleasing any information which ties a password back to an individuallyidentifiable user to the general public and without releasing anyinformation which can identify the original password, EBAY may publishpassword tokens of all the passwords thought to have been compromised.As a subscriber to the password breach registry, GMAIL searches for anypassword tokens which match password tokens in its own repository. GMAILmay then automatically reset those breached passwords and force thoseusers to reauthenticate and select new passwords. In embodiments, theseproactive measures may be accomplished via email, SMS, in-person, andthe like.

Accordingly, one embodiment of the present disclosure is directed to anon-transitory computer storage medium storing computer-useableinstructions that, when used by a computing device, causes the computingdevice to perform operations to facilitate utilizing a password breachregistry to secure a service. The operations comprise subscribing, by afirst service provider, to a password breach registry that comprisespassword tokens written by breached service providers. The passwordtokens indicate passwords that have been breached. The operations alsocomprise querying, by the first service provider, the password breachregistry to determine if a password token corresponding to a user of aservice provided by the first service provider has been written to thepassword breach registry. The operations further comprise, upondetermining the password token has been written to the password breachregistry, locking out the user from the service.

In another embodiment, the present disclosure is directed to acomputer-implemented method to facilitate utilizing a password breachregistry to secure a service. The method comprises determining a hashfunction for a breached token written to a password breach registry, thebreached token corresponding to a breached user of a breached service.The method also comprises, upon determining the hash function is used bya first service provider to create a first service token, comparing thebreached token to the first service token. The method further comprises,upon determining the hash function is not used by the first serviceprovider to create the first service token, utilizing the hash functionfor a first service password of the user to create a comparable firstservice token and comparing the breached token to the comparable firstservice token. The method also comprises, based on the comparing,determining the first service token or the comparable first servicetoken is the breached token and locking out the user from the service.

In yet another embodiment, the present disclosure is directed to acomputerized system for facilitating utilizing a password breachregistry to secure a service. The system includes a processor and acomputer storage medium storing computer-useable instructions that, whenused by the processor, cause the processor to determine a hash functionfor a breached token written to a password breach registry. The breachedtoken corresponds to a breached user of a breached service. The breachedtoken is compared to a first service token that was created by the firstservice provider with a first service password of the user by utilizingthe hash function. Based on the comparing, the first service token isdetermined to be the breached token and the user is locked out from theservice.

Referring now to FIG. 1, a block diagram is provided that illustrates apassword breach registry system 100 for utilizing a password breachregistry to secure a service, in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent disclosure. It should be understood that this and otherarrangements described herein are set forth only as examples. Otherarrangements and elements (e.g., machines, interfaces, functions,orders, and groupings of functions, etc.) can be used in addition to orinstead of those shown, and some elements may be omitted altogether.Further, many of the elements described herein are functional entitiesthat may be implemented as discrete or distributed components or inconjunction with other components, and in any suitable combination andlocation. Various functions described herein as being performed by oneor more entities may be carried out by hardware, firmware, and/orsoftware. For instance, various functions may be carried out by aprocessor executing instructions stored in memory. The password breachregistry system 100 may be implemented via any type of computing device,such as computing device 500 described below with reference to FIG. 5,for example. In various embodiments, the password breach registry system100 may be implemented via a single device or multiple devicescooperating in a distributed environment.

The password breach registry system 100 generally operates to provide apassword breach registry that enables subscribers to publish tokens thatidentify passwords of users that may have been breached. As shown inFIG. 1, the password breach system 100 includes, among other componentsnot shown, a user device 110, a password breach registry 114, serviceprovider A 116, and service provider B 118. It should be understood thatthe password breach registry system 100 shown in FIG. 1 is an example ofone suitable computing system architecture. Each of the components shownin FIG. 1 may be implemented via any type of computing device, such ascomputing device 500 described with reference to FIG. 5, for example.

The components may communicate with each other via a network 112, whichmay include, without limitation, one or more local area networks (LANs)and/or wide area networks (WANs). Such networking environments arecommonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets,and the Internet. It should be understood that any number of userdevices, password breach registries, and service providers may beemployed within the password breach system 100 within the scope of thepresent disclosure. Each may comprise a single device or multipledevices cooperating in a distributed environment. For instance, thepassword breach registry 114 may be provided via multiple devicesarranged in a distributed environment that collectively provide thefunctionality described herein. Additionally, other components not shownmay also be included within the network environment.

As shown in FIG. 1, the password breach system 100 includes a passwordbreach registry 114. While only a single password breach registry 114 isshown in FIG. 1, it should be understood that the password breachregistry system 100 may employ any number of password breach registries(which may include local copies of the password breach registry that areregularly synchronized with the password breach registry). The passwordbreach registry 114 may be utilized by service provider A 116 and/orservice provider B 118 to prevent malicious actors from breachingservices provided by service provider A 116 and/or service provider B118.

In embodiments, the password breach registry 114 is in a blockchain-likeformat that prevents tampering and revision. The blockchain-like formatprovides a publicly accessible distributed database that maintains acontinuously growing list of data blocks. Each data block containstime-stamped batches of transactions and a hash of the prior block. Thisenables the blocks to be linked together to form a chain. Thetransactions are the content (e.g., password tokens) that is stored inthe password breach registry 114 and are provided via service providers116, 118 or user devices 110. A service provider 116, 118 or user device110 is able to connect to the password breach registry 114 via thenetwork 112, send new transactions to it, verify transactions, andcreate new blocks.

Additionally or alternatively, a service provider 116, 118 or userdevice 110 can maintain a local copy of the password breach registry.Transactions may be provided to the local copy of the password breachregistry and broadcast to the password breach registry 114. Each serviceprovider having a local copy of the password breach registry 114 mayreceive the broadcasted transactions. Because each service provider hasa local copy of the password breach registry 114, there is no need tohave a centralized database managed by a trusted third party.Transactions can be broadcast to the network using softwareapplications. As a service provider validates transactions, thetransactions are added to the local copy and broadcast to other serviceproviders. Alternatively, each service provider having a local copy ofthe password breach registry 114 may periodically or on an ad hoc basissynchronize with the password breach registry 114.

The local copy of the password breach registry can be queriedperiodically or on an ad hoc basis to determine whether any passwordtokens match a password token that corresponds to a password of the useror a user affiliated with the service password. Having a local copy ofthe password breach registry 114 enables the service provider 116, 118or user device 110 to maintain privacy over the queries that are runagainst the password breach registry 114.

In embodiments, the password breach registry system 100 enables eachsubscribing service provider to query the latest version of the passwordbreach registry, even though a breached service provider may publishpassword tokens to local copies of the password breach registry (whichare synchronized with the password breach registry 114). A subscribingservice provider may determine, with reasonable certainty, whether atransaction (i.e., a password token corresponding to a user of thesubscribing service provider) does or does not exist in the datasetwhich enables the service provider to readily identify whether any usersof its service utilize a password token that has been written to thepassword breach registry.

Further, because of the blockchain-format, there is a prohibitively highcost to attempt to rewrite or alter transaction history. This prevents amalicious actor from modifying or removing password tokens that havealready been written to the password breach registry 114. For example,if a password token has been written to the password breach registry 114indicating a user of a service has had its password stolen, a maliciousactor cannot simply modify or remove the password token. Rather, sinceit has already published to the blockchain, other service providers areable to take steps to protect services they provide that the useraccesses with the same credentials.

For clarity, a password token is a protected or encrypted version of apassword. In this way, if a particular password has been leaked, thebreached service provider publishes the password token to the passwordbreach registry 114 and the actual password that has been breached isnot revealed. In some embodiments, a cryptographic hash function is usedto generate a password token and protect the content of the actualpassword. A cryptographic hash function is a mathematical algorithm thatmaps data of arbitrary size (i.e., the password) to a bit string of afixed size (i.e., the password token). The hash function is designed tobe a one-way function so the password cannot be reverse engineered.Examples of hash functions may include, without limitation, secure hashalgorithm 2 (SHA-2) or SHA-3 (formerly referred to as Keccak). It iscontemplated that any hash function may be used any number of times inaccordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.

Additionally or alternatively, the password token may be an associativelabel created by the user that the user mentally associates with thepassword (e.g., “Main Password”). An example of this might be a stringthat the user writes down and associates with a particular site. Anotherexample might be a password hint the user selects to help the userremember the password for the particular site. In each example,discovery of this string does not reveal the actual password.

In some embodiments, the password token is automatically generated by apassword manager, a separate application, or a browser plugin.Alternatively, the service provider may generate the password tokenbased on the password. In this scenario, the password is changedsignificantly and in a computationally expensive way to prevent amalicious actor from regenerating the password from the token. Forexample, the service provider may utilize a hash function, as describedabove, to hash the password a random and high number of times. Theusername may be utilized as a salt, or additional input, to the one-wayhash function. The incorporation of the username as a salt may deterbrute force dictionary attacks against a list of password hashes orprecomputed rainbow table (i.e., a precomputed table used to reversecryptographic hash functions) attacks.

In practice, and referring now to FIG. 2, upon determining a service hasbeen breached, service provider A 212 writes a new block to the passwordbreach registry 216. As mentioned above the new block contains apassword token so that information about the password (e.g., content,length) is protected. In embodiments, the password token is a word orrandom string created by the user that the user mentally associates witha particular password. In embodiments, the password token is generatedautomatically by a password manager, a separate application, or abrowser plugin. In embodiments, the password token is generated byservice provider A 212, utilizing a hash function, as described above.Additionally, service provider A 212 may publish the usernamecorresponding to the breached password as well as the hash functionutilized to create the password token.

Service provider B 214 may periodically or regularly query the passwordbreach registry 216 for usernames and/or password tokens that correspondto usernames and/or password tokens associated with a service (i.e.,service B) provided by service provider B 214. Additionally oralternatively, service provider B 214 may synchronize a local copy ofthe password breach registry with the password breach registry 216 andquery only the local copy of the password breach registry. By onlyquerying the local copy of the password breach registry, serviceprovider B 214 may further protect its users by not exposing content ofuser queries to the outside world. This implementation prevents amalicious actor from intercepting the queries and identifying users ofservice B. If the malicious actor is able to identify users of serviceB, the malicious actor may attempt to breach service B using stolenpasswords from other services.

As noted above, in some embodiments, each password token includes or ispublished with a hash function utilized by a particular breached serviceprovider to create the password token. If the service provider (i.e.,service provider B) querying the password breach registry 216 utilizes adifferent hash function than a service provider (i.e., service providerA) that has published password tokens to the password breach registry216, service provider B will be unable to identify whether users ofservice B have credentials that have been breached because the passwordtokens will not match. Accordingly, service provider B can createcomparable tokens by hashing passwords for each user of service Butilizing the identified hash function. In some embodiments, serviceprovider B identifies common users with service provider A (by comparingpublished user names of service A to user names of service B). Toconserve resources, service provider B can create comparable tokens foronly the common users.

Upon service provider B 214 determining a user of service B has been thevictim of a breach at a different service, service provider B 214 locksthe user out of the account for service B. At this point, the maliciousactor is no longer able to breach service B utilizing the stolencredentials. The user is only able to utilize service B again afterfulfilling proactive safety measures required by service provider B 214.

In some embodiments, service provider B 214 sends the user an email thatrequires the user to follow a link provided in the body of the emailthat enables the user to provide a new password. In some embodiments,the link initially requires the user to provide additional informationprior to being able to provide a new password. In some embodiments, thelink forces the user to authenticate via a third-party website orservice. The use of the link provides service provider B 214confirmation that the user is not the malicious actor.

In some embodiments, service provider B 214 sends the user a shortmessage service (SMS) text that provides the user a code to enter priorto providing a new password. The SMS text may also contain a link, asdescribed above, that the user can follow to provide a new password oradditional information prior to utilizing service B. In this way, thecode enables service provider B 214 to confirm that the user is not themalicious actor.

In some embodiments, service provider B 214 may require the user toprovide in-person verification of the user's identity. For example,service provider B 214 may send the user a communication asking the userto provide proof of identification at a nearby location (e.g., anoffice, a retail setting, etc.). Examples of proof of identification mayinclude photo identification, signature confirmation, deviceidentification, and the like.

Each of the proactive safety measures described above prevent stolencredentials from being tested and used to access other services the useraccesses with the same credentials. In this way, a malicious actor isunable to use credentials taken from a breached service and attempt toaccess other services using the stolen credentials. Rather, oncepassword tokens have been published to the password breach registry byservice provider A 212, service provider B 214 can compare the breachedpassword tokens to password tokens for users of service B. Uponidentifying any matches, service provider B 214 locks out thecorresponding user from accessing service B until the required proactivemeasures have been satisfied.

Turning now to FIG. 3, a flow diagram is provided that illustrates amethod 300 for utilizing a password breach registry to secure a service,in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. Forinstance, the method 300 may be employed utilizing the password breachregistry system 100 of FIG. 1. As shown at step 310, a first serviceprovider subscribes to a password breach registry that includes passwordtokens written by breached service providers. As described above, thepassword tokens indicate passwords that have been breached.

In some embodiments, the password tokens include usernames, hashedpasswords, and hash functions used by the breached service providers.The password tokens may be random strings created by users or generatedby a password manager. The password tokens may not include anypersonally identifiable information or information that identifies thepasswords. Regardless of how the password tokens are created, thecorresponding passwords cannot be reconstructed using the passwordtokens.

The first service provider queries, at step 312, the password breachregistry to determine if a password token corresponding to a user of aservice provided by the first service provider has been written to thepassword breach registry. Upon determining the password token has beenwritten to the password breach registry, at step 314, the user is lockedout from the service.

In some embodiments, a hash function utilized by a particular breachedservice provider is identified. The hash function may be written to thepassword breach registry along with or, as mentioned above, as part ofthe password token. If the hash function is different than the one usedby the first service provider to create password tokens, comparabletokens may be created by the first service provider. To do so, the firstservice provider hashes passwords for each user of the service providedby the first service provider utilizing the identified hash function.The password tokens published to the password breach registry can thenbe compared to the comparable tokens created by the first serviceprovider.

In some embodiments, user names that have accounts with the firstservice provider are used in queries to the password breach registry todetermine if similar user names have accounts that have been breached.If similar user names are found, password tokens of the similar usernames can be compared to password tokens of user names that haveaccounts with the first service provider.

Referring now to FIG. 4, a flow diagram is provided that illustrates amethod 400 for locking out a user corresponding to a breached token froma service, in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.For instance, the method 400 may be employed utilizing the passwordbreach registry system 100 of FIG. 1. As shown at step 410, a hashfunction for a breached token written to a password breach registry isinitially determined. As described above, the breached token correspondsto a password of a breached user of a breached service.

Upon determining the hash function is used by a first service providerto create a first service token, the breached token is compared, at step412, to the first service token. In other words, if the first serviceprovider and a breached service provider of a breached service utilizethe same hash function, then password tokens created by each serviceprovider can be compared to determine if the corresponding passwords arethe same.

On the other hand, if the first service provider and a breached serviceprovider of a breached service do not utilize the same hash function,then password tokens created by each service provider cannot be comparedto determine if the corresponding passwords are the same. In this case,upon determining the hash function is not used by the first serviceprovider to create the first service token, the hash function utilizedby the breached service provider is utilized, at step 414, for a firstservice password of the user to create a comparable first service token.The breached token can then be compared to the comparable first servicetoken.

In some embodiments, the first token and the breached token aregenerated by a password manager utilizing a hash function.Alternatively, the first token may be generated by the first serviceprovider utilizing a first service hash function and the breached tokenmay be generated by the breached service provider utilizing the hashfunction. The breached token may not include any personally identifiableinformation or information that identifies the password. Additionally, apassword cannot be reconstructed using the breached token.

Based on the comparing, it is determined, at step 416, that the firstservice token or the comparable first service token is the breachedtoken and the user is locked out from the service. In some embodiments,the user is required to change a password before utilizing the service.Consequently, a new first service token may be generated for the user.

Having described embodiments of the present disclosure, an exemplaryoperating environment in which embodiments of the present disclosure maybe implemented is described below in order to provide a general contextfor various aspects of the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 5 inparticular, an exemplary operating environment for implementingembodiments of the present disclosure is shown and designated generallyas computing device 500. Computing device 500 is but one example of asuitable computing environment and is not intended to suggest anylimitation as to the scope of use or functionality of the inventiveembodiments. Neither should the computing device 500 be interpreted ashaving any dependency or requirement relating to any one or combinationof components illustrated.

The inventive embodiments may be described in the general context ofcomputer code or machine-useable instructions, includingcomputer-executable instructions such as program modules, being executedby a computer or other machine, such as a personal data assistant orother handheld device. Generally, program modules including routines,programs, objects, components, data structures, etc., refer to code thatperform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types.The inventive embodiments may be practiced in a variety of systemconfigurations, including handheld devices, consumer electronics,general-purpose computers, more specialty computing devices, etc. Theinventive embodiments may also be practiced in distributed computingenvironments where tasks are performed by remote-processing devices thatare linked through a communications network.

With reference to FIG. 5, computing device 500 includes a bus 510 thatdirectly or indirectly couples the following devices: memory 512, one ormore processors 514, one or more presentation components 516,input/output (I/O) ports 518, input/output (I/O) components 520, and anillustrative power supply 522. Bus 510 represents what may be one ormore busses (such as an address bus, data bus, or combination thereof).Although the various blocks of FIG. 5 are shown with lines for the sakeof clarity, in reality, delineating various components is not so clear,and metaphorically, the lines would more accurately be grey and fuzzy.For example, one may consider a presentation component such as a displaydevice to be an I/O component. Also, processors have memory. Theinventors recognize that such is the nature of the art, and reiteratethat the diagram of FIG. 5 is merely illustrative of an exemplarycomputing device that can be used in connection with one or moreembodiments of the present disclosure. Distinction is not made betweensuch categories as “workstation,” “server,” “laptop,” “handheld device,”etc., as all are contemplated within the scope of FIG. 5 and referenceto “computing device.”

Computing device 500 typically includes a variety of computer-readablemedia. Computer-readable media can be any available media that can beaccessed by computing device 500 and includes both volatile andnonvolatile media, removable and non-removable media. By way of example,and not limitation, computer-readable media may comprise computerstorage media and communication media. Computer storage media includesboth volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable mediaimplemented in any method or technology for storage of information suchas computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules orother data. Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM,ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digitalversatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes,magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices,or any other medium which can be used to store the desired informationand which can be accessed by computing device 500. Computer storagemedia does not comprise signals per se. Communication media typicallyembodies computer-readable instructions, data structures, programmodules or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier waveor other transport mechanism and includes any information deliverymedia. The term “modulated data signal” means a signal that has one ormore of its characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encodeinformation in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation,communication media includes wired media such as a wired network ordirect-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF,infrared and other wireless media. Combinations of any of the aboveshould also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.

Memory 512 includes computer storage media in the form of volatileand/or nonvolatile memory. The memory may be removable, non-removable,or a combination thereof. Exemplary hardware devices include solid-statememory, hard drives, optical-disc drives, etc. Computing device 500includes one or more processors that read data from various entitiessuch as memory 512 or I/O components 520. Presentation component(s) 516present data indications to a user or other device. Exemplarypresentation components include a display device, speaker, printingcomponent, vibrating component, etc.

I/O ports 518 allow computing device 500 to be logically coupled toother devices including I/O components 520, some of which may be builtin. Illustrative components include a microphone, joystick, game pad,satellite dish, scanner, printer, wireless device, etc. The I/Ocomponents 520 may provide a natural user interface (NUI) that processesair gestures, voice, or other physiological inputs generated by a user.In some instances, inputs may be transmitted to an appropriate networkelement for further processing. An NUI may implement any combination ofspeech recognition, touch and stylus recognition, facial recognition,biometric recognition, gesture recognition both on screen and adjacentto the screen, air gestures, head and eye tracking, and touchrecognition associated with displays on the computing device 500. Thecomputing device 500 may be equipped with depth cameras, such asstereoscopic camera systems, infrared camera systems, RGB camerasystems, and combinations of these, for gesture detection andrecognition. Additionally, the computing device 500 may be equipped withaccelerometers or gyroscopes that enable detection of motion. The outputof the accelerometers or gyroscopes may be provided to the display ofthe computing device 500 to render immersive augmented reality orvirtual reality.

As can be understood, embodiments of the present disclosure provide foran objective approach for utilizing a password breach registry to securea service. The present disclosure has been described in relation toparticular embodiments, which are intended in all respects to beillustrative rather than restrictive. Alternative embodiments willbecome apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art to which thepresent disclosure pertains without departing from its scope.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that this disclosure is one welladapted to attain all the ends and objects set forth above, togetherwith other advantages which are obvious and inherent to the system andmethod. It will be understood that certain features and subcombinationsare of utility and may be employed without reference to other featuresand subcombinations. This is contemplated by and is within the scope ofthe claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer-implemented method comprising:maintaining, by a first service provider, a local copy of a passwordbreach registry, the password breach registry comprising password tokensprovided by the first service provider, other service providers, or userdevices; determining a password of a first user account of a firstservice provided by the first service provider has been breached;writing a first password token corresponding to the password of thefirst user of a first service to the local copy of the password breachregistry, the password tokens being a protected or encrypted version ofpasswords corresponding to users of services provided by the firstservice provider or other service providers; and synchronizing the localcopy of the password breach registry with the password breach registry,the synchronizing comprising broadcasting password tokens written to thelocal copy of the password breach registry to the other serviceproviders and receiving password tokens of breached users from the otherservice providers.
 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising lockingthe first user account out of the first service.
 3. The method of claim1, further comprising, querying the local copy of the password breachregistry, by the first service provider, to determine if a secondpassword token corresponding to second user account of the first serviceprovided by the first service provider has been written to the passwordbreach registry.
 4. The method of claim 3, further comprising comparingthe second password token to a plurality of first service tokens, theplurality of first service tokens corresponding to passwords of usersaccounts of the first service, each first service token corresponding toa first service password for the user of the service.
 5. The method ofclaim 4, further comprising, based on the comparing, determining a firstservice token of the plurality of first service tokens matches thesecond password token.
 6. The method of claim 5, further comprisinglocking the second user account out of the first service.
 7. The methodof claim 4, further comprising identifying a hash function correspondingto the second password token.
 8. The method of claim 7, furthercomprising creating a plurality of comparable tokens, utilizing theidentified hash function, by hashing passwords of user accounts of thefirst service.
 9. The method of claim 8, further comprising comparingthe second password token to the plurality of comparable tokens.
 10. Themethod of claim 9, further comprising, based on the comparing,determining a comparable token of the plurality of comparable tokens isequivalent to the password token indicating a user account correspondingto the comparable token utilizes the same password for the first serviceand a breached service.
 11. The method of claim 1, further comprisinglocking the second user account out of the first service.
 12. One ormore computer storage media having computer-executable instructionsembodied thereon that, when executed by a computer, causes the computerto perform operations, the operations comprising: maintaining, by afirst service provider, a local copy of a password breach registry, thepassword breach registry comprising password tokens provided by thefirst service provider, other service providers, or user devices;determining a password of a first user account of a first serviceprovided by the first service provider has been breached; writing afirst password token corresponding to the password of the first user ofa first service to the local copy of the password breach registry, thepassword tokens being a protected or encrypted version of passwordscorresponding to users of services provided by the first serviceprovider or other service providers; synchronizing the local copy of thepassword breach registry with the password breach registry, thesynchronizing comprising broadcasting password tokens written to thelocal copy of the password breach registry to the other serviceproviders and receiving password tokens of breached users from the otherservice providers; locking the first user account out of the firstservice; and querying the local copy of the password breach registry, bythe first service provider, to determine if a second password tokencorresponding to second user account of the first service has beenwritten to the password breach registry by another service provider ofthe other service providers.
 13. The media of claim 12, furthercomprising comparing the second password token to a plurality of firstservice tokens, the plurality of first service tokens corresponding topasswords of users accounts of the first service, each first servicetoken corresponding to a first service password for the user of theservice.
 14. The media of claim 13, further comprising, based on thecomparing, determining a first service token of the plurality of firstservice tokens matches the second password token.
 15. The media of claim14, further comprising locking the second user account out of the firstservice.
 16. The media of claim 12, further comprising identifying ahash function corresponding to the second password token.
 17. The mediaclaim 16, further comprising creating a plurality of comparable tokens,utilizing the identified hash function, by hashing passwords of useraccounts of the first service.
 18. The media of claim 17, furthercomprising comparing the second password token to the plurality ofcomparable tokens.
 19. The media of claim 18, further comprising, basedon the comparing, determining a comparable token of the plurality ofcomparable tokens is equivalent to the password token indicating a useraccount corresponding to the comparable token utilizes the same passwordfor the first service and a breached service.
 20. A computerized systemcomprising: a processor; and a computer storage medium storingcomputer-useable instructions that, when used by the processor, causesthe processor to: maintain, by a first service provider, a local copy ofa password breach registry, the password breach registry comprisingpassword tokens provided by the first service provider, other serviceproviders, or user devices; determine a password of a first user accountof a first service provided by the first service provider has beenbreached; write a first password token corresponding to the password ofthe first user of a first service to the local copy of the passwordbreach registry, the password tokens being a protected or encryptedversion of passwords corresponding to users of services provided by thefirst service provider or other service providers; synchronize the localcopy of the password breach registry with the password breach registry,the synchronizing comprising broadcasting password tokens written to thelocal copy of the password breach registry to the other serviceproviders and receiving password tokens of breached users from the otherservice providers; lock the first user account out of the first service;query the local copy of the password breach registry, by the firstservice provider, to determine if a second password token correspondingto second user account of the first service has been written to thepassword breach registry by another service provider of the otherservice providers; comprising identifying a hash function correspondingto the second password token; create a plurality of comparable tokens,utilizing the identified hash function, by hashing passwords of useraccounts of the first service; compare the second password token to theplurality of comparable tokens; and based on the comparing, determine acomparable token of the plurality of comparable tokens is equivalent tothe password token indicating a user account corresponding to thecomparable token utilizes the same password for the first service and abreached service.